This is the first in a series of Blogs regarding the senate, see links below.
There is no realistic means by which to make constitutional changes with respect to the senate. The key for the Senate now, is to work within the box to get out of the box. The senate has considerable “power”, collectively; the senate has the ability to “discipline” the commons and the PMO. The question is how to effect strong enough leadership within the senate to assert its assent from subordinate, to its rightful place as peer. It is supposed to be the third leg of accountability, it has been for a generation inept at fulfilling its mandate. So leave the constitution as is and exercise the senate’s constitutional power as it is now equipped, to gain both stature and to truly be the house of sober second thought.
The senate is an organ of Canada, in
theory; regional concerns should only weigh on deliberations to ensure equity
in terms of regional benefits from the federation. The structure, as you point
out, is a product of political appeasement and hence flawed. The senate itself
is the only entity with the ability to remedy the attachment to regional concern;
the senate needs to exercise its influence to become an entity totally administered
in a manner that is “a” regional. The senate needs to set aside generalized political
concern and focus on being a monitor of legislation. The present structure as
per the constitution provisions the senate with the ability withhold approval
of legislation, which is all the influence that is required to ensure that legislation
is monitored and to ensure the government delivers outcomes as promised. In Canadian governance
accountability is grossly under pursued; it’s essential that we find a mechanism
by which to force government to account.
The challenge with the election of
the senators or the present modalities is that it “politicizes” the senate, political interplay is the
cause for the recent discredit. If I may call your attention to the Bank of
Canada, likely, the most effective government entity we have; an arm lengths relationship
with the government, a clearly defined mandate and “a” political. The senate,
due to it’s functionality, has the capacity to effect selection modalities as
desired. A senator needs to be an individual that is wholly committed to the
furtherance of the dominion, that is to say, partisan loyalties need to be isolated
from the senate for it to effectively pursue its mandate as a “house of sober second thought”; the only
real way to achieve this it to create a selection process that is free of
partisan influence. There are many Canadians that hold no party affiliation, or
at least and as the supreme court functions, have an academic understanding of
their obligation to objective participation. There is a fine line between
democracy and mob rule, presently we elect a dictator who is wholly at the whim
of the mob, the senate has the constitutional capital to offer resistance to the
mob, as it were, and offer a chamber of pristine assessment. This is offered to
promote “objective” assessment of government action as to opposed to diminishing
the group sourcing of government direction. The government is adrift with
respect to accountability; the senate has the ability to, and must, seek to
position itself to fill the cap.
The senate needs to lift itself
above the fray. The senate needs to seek to service the interests of the country
as a functionary that offers sober second thought. As it needs to be “a”
political, it needs to be “a” regional. There needs to be, through strong
leadership in the senate, the creation of a pan Canadian cultural imperative.
The senate’s calling is higher than the pettiness of partisanship and regional
concern, the senate is there to ensure the entity that is Canada remains
strong. The two solitudes, or four solitudes, should hold no place in senate deliberation.
The solitudes weaken us, we need to act for the whole; the provinces are big
enough to take care of themselves.
The connection between active political
concern and the senate must be eliminated or challenged as aggressively as
possible. There may be Privy Council discourse in grave circumstance, the
general administration of government needs an objective eye, let the senate
fill that role.
There is no realistic means on the
horizon to alter the written law related to the senate, institutional inertia
has eliminated all possible avenues in this regard, the confluence of senate
action under the banner of “Pan Canadian Interest” is the only means by which
the senate can offer real and meaningful contribution. There are no external means for the senate to
change, the senate can only change how it uses the law it is given; the senate
and only the senate can facilitate the move from lap dog to functionary.
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